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BURCH V. STATE: MAINTAINING THE JURY'S TRADITIONAL
ROLE AS THE VOICE OF THE COMMUNITY IN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES
In Burch v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a trial judge had authority under Maryland Rule 4-345(b)2 to
reconsider ajury-determined sentence of death.3 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court explored the United States Supreme Court's discus-
sions of death penalty legislation, as well as Maryland's own capital
punishment legislative history,4 and concluded that because the trial
judge had no discretion to alter the jury-determined sentence of
death at the time of the verdict, he could not subsequently reconsider
the sentence and reduce it to life imprisonment. 5 In rejecting the
defendant's request for reconsideration of his death sentence, the
court properly recognized both the jury's role as the voice of the com-
munity and the need for increased reliability in capital case sentenc-
ing decisions.
I. THE CASE
On March 22, 1996, a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County convicted Heath William Burch of the premeditated
first-degree murders of Robert and Cleo Davis.6 The jury also found
Burch guilty of three counts of felony murder, based on the underly-
ing felonies of burglary, robbery, and robbery with a deadly weapon.7
1. 358 Md. 278, 747 A.2d 1209 (2000).
2. MD. R. 4-345(b). The Rule states:
The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed
within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not
been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been
filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in
case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (d) of this Rule.
Id.
3. Burch, 358 Md. at 280, 747 A.2d at 1210.
4. Id. at 281-92, 747 A.2d at 1211-16.
5. Id. at 294-96, 747 A.2d at 1217-18.
6. See id. at 280, 747 A.2d at 1210; Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 259, 696 A.2d 443, 446,
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1001 (1997). The earlier Court of Appeals decision described in
greater detail the facts and circumstances of the case and the aggravating factors that led
the jury to a sentence of death. The jury found that Burch had broken into the home of
Robert and Cleo Davis with the intention of stealing property to sell for cocaine. Burch,
346 Md. at 259, 696 A.2d at 446. Mr. and Mrs. Davis awoke to the sound of Burch entering
the house, and when they confronted him, he violently and fatally attacked them and pro-
ceeded to steal guns, money, and Mr. Davis's truck. Id.
7. Burch, 346 Md. at 259, 696 A.2d at 446.
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The jury sentenced Burch to death, and the trial judge imposed two
death sentences, one for each victim.'
Pursuant to the mandatory procedure in death penalty cases, the
case proceeded directly to the Court of Appeals.9 Burch also filed a
motion in circuit court for reconsideration of his death sentence pur-
suant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b), t ° and asked the trial court to hold
the motion sub curia until the parties requested a hearing.'"
The Court of Appeals affirmed the two guilty verdicts and one of
the death sentences, but vacated the second death sentence. t2 The
United States Supreme Court denied Burch's petition for certiorari, 13
and the trial court denied all attempts at post-conviction relief.14 Fi-
nally, the Court of Appeals denied his application for leave of
appeal. 15
Both parties then requested that the trial court hold a hearing on
Burch's motion for reconsideration of sentence.16 On January 28,
1999, the circuit court heard the motion, and the trial judge ruled
that he lacked the authority to reconsider ajury-determined sentence
of death and thus denied Burch's motion.'"
8. Id. Thejury and court acted in accordance with the death penalty law of Maryland.
The law requires the jury (or the judge, if the defendant waives a jury trial) first to deter-
mine whether the defendant "is guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the
second degree." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(a) (1996). The law then requires a separate
sentencing hearing to be held in order to determine the punishment. Id. § 413(a). If the
jury (or judge) determines that a sentence of death is the appropriate punishment, "then
the court shall impose a sentence of death." Id. § 413(k).
9. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(a).
10. MD. R. 4-345(b); see supra note 2 (setting forth the language of the Rule that allows
for sentence reconsideration).
11. Burch, 358 Md. at 280-81, 747 A.2d at 1210.
12. Burch, 346 Md. at 299, 696 A.2d at 466. The Court of Appeals held that both
sentences of death were unimpeachable, but because only one death sentence can be car-
ried out, the court vacated one of the sentences in favor of life imprisonment and left the
other sentence undisturbed. Id. at 291-92, 696 A.2d at 462-63. The court reasoned that
this remedy would effectuate the intent and determination of the jury. Id at 292, 696 A.2d
at 463. Because the jury had sentenced Burch to die for both murders, the court stated
that vacating one sentence over the other made no difference. Id. The court affirmed the
sentence imposed for the murder of Mr. Davis and remanded the sentence for the murder
of Mrs. Davis for entry of a sentence of life imprisonment. Id.
13. Burch v. Maryland, 522 U.S. 1001 (1997).
14. Burch, 358 Md. at 281, 747 A.2d at 1210.
15. Id.
16. Id., 747 A.2d at 1211.
17. Id Judge Platt, the same judge that had presided over Burch's original trial, held
that Maryland Rule 4-345 did not apply to jury-determined sentences of death. Id. Also,
because the trial judge must impose the death penalty when a jury determines a sentence
of death, the circuit court did not have the authority to reconsider the sentence. Id.
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The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider "whether the
trial judge properly concluded that he had no authority under Mary-
land Rule 4-345(b) to modify a jury-determined sentence of death."1 8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Burch v. State, the Court of Appeals outlined the recent history
of the United States Supreme Court's death penalty decisions. 19 Ex-
amination of this history demonstrates that the Supreme Court scruti-
nized death penalty statutes during two periods-between 1972 and
1976, and after 1976. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,2 ° the Supreme
Court for the first time reversed death sentences on constitutional
grounds.2  The Court spoke again on the constitutionality of death
penalty statutes in five cases that were all decided on July 2, 1976, and
provided a constitutional framework for death penalty statutes within
which the states had some discretion.22 In addition to the Court of
Appeals's review of this history, an examination of the traditional role
of the jury in capital punishment cases yields another basis for the
Burch decision.23
18. Id. at 280, 747 A.2d at 1210.
19. Id. at 286-89, 747 A.2d at 1213-15.
20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Thus, these discretionary [death pen-
alty] statutes are unconstitutional in their operation."); id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring)
("The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual,' and the States may no longer
inflict it as a punishment for crimes."); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply con-
clude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sen-
tence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed."); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) ("In my judgment what was done
in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment."); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[E]ven if capital punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amend-
ment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in
their history.").
22. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) ("For the reasons expressed in this
opinion, we hold that the statutory system under which Gregg was sentenced to death does
not violate the Constitution.");Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("Because [Texas's
capital sentencing] system serves to assure that sentences of death will not be 'wantonly' or
'freakishly' imposed, it does not violate the Constitution." (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 310
(Stewart, J., concurring))); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) ("Accordingly,
we find that the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner under Louisiana's mandatory
death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be set
aside."); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976) ("Florida, like Georgia, has responded
to Furman by enacting legislation that passes constitutional muster."); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death
sentences imposed upon the petitioners under North Carolina's mandatory death sen-
tence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must be set
aside."); see also infta Part II.B (describing these five cases and the results of each opinion).
23. See Burch, 358 Md. at 290, 747 A.2d at 1215-16 (noting that Florida's capital sentenc-
ing procedure, in which juries render "advisory" sentences, "departs from the traditional
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A. Furman v. Georgia: The Death Penalty in Violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments
In Furman, a majority of the Supreme Court reversed death pen-
alty sentences on constitutional grounds, holding that the death
sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishments and thus vio-
lated the Eighth2 4 and Fourteenth25 Amendments to the United
States Constitution.2 6 In response to Furman, many states rushed to
conform their existing death penalty statutes to what they understood
were the newly enunciated constitutional requirements. 27 Maryland
reacted by invalidating its former discretionary death penalty statute28
and by establishing a mandatory death penalty regime. 29
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether "the imposition and carrying out of the death pen-
alty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
role of the jury in Maryland in capital cases" (quoting Memorandum from ThomasJ. Ped-
dicord,Jr., Chief Legislative Officer, to the Maryland General Assembly 19 (Dec. 14, 1977)
(available at the Maryland Department of Legislative Reference Library, Bill File for S.B.
374 (1978)))); see also infra Part II.E (explaining the role of the jury in capital punishment
cases).
24. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
25. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. See supra note 21 (citing the decisions ofJustices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
and Marshall).
27. See Roxane J. Perruso, And Then There Were Three: Colorado's New Death Penalty Sen-
tencing Statute, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189, 190 (1997) (explaining that within two years,
twenty-nine states had enacted new death penalty statutes in response to Furman).
28. See Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 184, 297 A.2d 696, 701 (1972) (finding that
a death penalty statute is unconstitutional if its imposition is not mandatory). The former
Maryland statute stated: "Every person convicted of murder in the first degree ... shall
suffer death, or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State for the period of
their natural life, in the discretion of the court before whom such person may be tried .
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1957) (emphasis added).
29. Burch, 358 Md. at 287, 747 A.2d at 1214 (explaining that after the Court of Appeals
declared Maryland's death penalty statute unconstitutional in Bartholomey, the Maryland
legislature reacted by passing a mandatory death penalty regime, codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413 (1976)). A mandatory death penalty statute is one that entirely elimi-
nates a sentencer's discretion. Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Polit-
ics and Death, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 1403, 1413 (1996). A mandatory statute automatically
requires death sentences "for certain specified forms of murder." Id.
420
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tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."30 A sharply divided
Court produced nine separate opinions and voted 5-4 that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in these cases was unconstitutional. 1
Prior to the Furman decision, Georgia's and Florida's death pen-
alty statutes gave juries or judges uncontrolled discretion to impose
sentences of death.3 2 As Justice Douglas explained, however, the
Eighth Amendment demands that legislatures write laws that are
"evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary," and it requires that
'judges ... see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selec-
tively, and spottily to unpopular groups. ' 33  He reasoned that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
includes the theme of equal protection, 4 and that a punishment
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952, 952 (1971)). The Court granted certiorari to review the
decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia to impose the death penalty on defendants
convicted of murder and rape. Id. The Court also reviewed the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas to impose the death penalty on a defendant convicted of rape.
Id. The statutes of each state left to the discretion of the judge or the jury the determina-
tion of whether the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
31. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Mar-
shall filed separate opinions in support of the judgment, while Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. Justices
Brennan and Marshall found that a state's imposition of the death penalty constitutes a
cruel and unusual punishment in all cases and in all circumstances. Id. at 305 (Brennan,J.,
concurring); id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Douglas concluded that the
sentencing discretion allowed in the statutes violated the principle of equal protection
implicit in the Eighth Amendment because such statutes had been infrequently and arbi-
trarily applied to unpopular groups. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stew-
art decided that discretionary statutes had been arbitrarily applied in "wanton," "freakish"
manners and thus violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 310 (StewartJ.,
concurring). Justice White believed that the infrequent imposition of the statutes sug-
gested that the death penalty no longer furthered any social or public purpose, making the
death penalty cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 312-14 (White, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger stated that Justices White and Stewart "fundamentally miscon-
ceive [d] the nature of the Eighth Amendment" and made decisions contrary to controlling
authority. Id. at 375 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded that the issue
was one for the legislative branch, not for the judiciary. Id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Powell held that none of the five Justices provided a constitutionally ade-
quate basis for his decision. Id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Rehnquist
raised concerns about the proper role of the Court and stated that the five Justices in the
plurality overstepped the boundary ofjudicial review. Id. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. See Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing
Death over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 35 (1985); see also Furman, 408 U.S.
at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that the death penalty statutes of these two states
"leave to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether de-
fendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no stan-
dards govern the selection of the penalty.").
33. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 249.
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should be considered "'unusually imposed if it is administered arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily.'"5 Similarly, Justice Marshall expressed
concern that the discretionary laws allowed discriminatory sentiments
to creep into decisions.36 Consequently, the five Justices supporting
the judgment held that unguided, discretionary sentencing authority
that resulted in the arbitrary, capricious, and random imposition of
the death penalty constituted a cruel and unusual punishment and
therefore violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. 7
As a result of its decision in Furman, the Supreme Court vacated
death sentences that had been imposed in 120 other pending cases
and remanded those cases for further proceedings. 3' After the state
courts heard the remanded cases, many legislatures overhauled their
existing death penalty statutes, and within four years, thirty-five states
enacted new death penalty laws.39 Because each of the nine Justices
had written a different opinion in Furman, however, the states had
difficulty determining what type of capital punishment statute the
Court would find constitutional.4" The states merely knew that unlim-
ited discretion was unconstitutional because it permitted sentencers to
impose the death sentence arbitrarily.4" In response to this confusion,
the federal government and at least ten states, including Maryland,4 2
35. Id. (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1970)).
36. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). To support his opinion, Justice Marshall pro-
vided statistics that showed race and gender discrimination in the application of discretion-
ary sentencing statutes. See id. at 264-66. For example, Marshall explained that of the 3859
people executed between 1930 and 1972, 1751 were white and 2066 were African Ameri-
can. Id. at 364. Of those executed, only 32 were women. Id. at 365; see also id. at 249-50
(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing evidence that the death penalty is "'disproportionately
imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups"'
(quoting THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967))).
37. See id at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-305 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 364-71
(Marshall, J., concurring).
38. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 183, 297 A.2d 696, 700 (1972).
39. Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty
Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 8 (1994).
40. Erlich, supra note 29, at 1412-13.
41. Id. at 1413.
42. See, e.g., Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 184, 297 A.2d at 701. The Court of Appeals held
that Maryland's existing death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it authorized,
but did not require, the jury or judge to impose the death penalty. Id The court ex-
plained that "the net result of the holding in Furman [was] that the death penalty is uncon-
stitutional when its imposition is not mandatory." Id. As a result, Maryland enacted Senate
Bill 292 (Chapter 252 of the Laws of Maryland of 1975), which provided for a mandatory
death penalty as punishment for convictions of nine types of first-degree murder. Memo-
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interpreted the Furman decision as requiring laws, that provided for
mandatory capital punishment in certain circumstances and subse-
quently passed such laws.
43
B. The States' Responses to Furman-Revised Death Penalty Statutes:
The 1976 Decisions
The Supreme Court decided five cases on July 2, 1976: Gregg v.
Georgia,44 Proffitt v. Florida,45 Jurek v. Texas,4 6 Woodson v. North Caro-
lina,47 and Roberts v. Louisiana.48 For each case, the Court considered
whether the imposition of the death sentence under the particular
state statute violated the Constitution.49 The five decisions helped to
clarify many of Furman's ambiguities, but they still did not clearly de-
fine the standard for a constitutional death penalty statute.5 °
1. North Carolina and Louisiana: Mandatory Death Penalty Statutes
in Response to Furman.-North Carolina and Louisiana both enacted
mandatory death penalty laws in response to the Furman decision."
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that although the
mandatory schemes prevented the unbridled discretion of a jury or
randum from Thomas J. Peddicord, Jr., supra note 23, at 3; see also Blackwell v. State, 278
Md. 466, 468-69, 365 A.2d 545, 547 (1976) (providing the text of Chapter 252 of the Laws
of Maryland of 1975 and describing the types of murder for which the death penalty is the
mandated punishment).
43. See Memorandum from Thomas J. Peddicord, Jr., supra note 23, at 3.
44. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) ("For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that
the statutory system under which Gregg was sentenced does not violate the Constitution.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court is affirmed.").
45. 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976) ("Florida, like Georgia, has responded to Furman by en-
acting legislation that passes constitutional muster.").
46. 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("Because [Texas's capital sentencing] system serves to
assure that sentences of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed, it does not
violate the Constitution.").
47. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death
sentences upon the petitioners under North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must be set aside.").
48. 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) ("Accordingly, we find that the death sentence imposed
upon the petitioner under Louisiana's mandatory death sentence statute violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be set aside.").
49. See Memorandum from Thomas J. Peddicord, Jr., supra note 23, at 4 (summarizing
the five cases).
50. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court's decisions were not definitive because they did not
point to one standard for all states to implement or follow. Id. The Court's opinions
provided a constitutional framework for death penalty statutes within which the states had
some discretion. See id
51. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87 (explaining that North Carolina responded to the
Furman decision by making the death penalty the mandatory punishment for all people
convicted of first-degree murder); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331 (explaining that Louisiana also
replaced its discretionary jury sentencing in capital cases with mandatory death sentences).
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judge, the states' new death penalty laws violated the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution.52 The Court explained that
the Eighth Amendment takes much of its meaning from "'the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."'"3 The Court examined the history of mandatory death penalty
laws and found that juries and legislatures had rejected such laws as
harsh and "unworkably rigid."54 The Court reasoned that because the
Eighth Amendment draws much of its meaning from present stan-
dards of decency, and society as a whole has moved away from
mandatory death penalty sentencing, such mandatory statutes violated
the Eighth Amendment in part because they follow a practice that
society has rejected. 5
The Court also concluded that mandatory death penalty statutes
fell short of constitutional requirements because they did not allow
particularized consideration of the character and record of each con-
victed defendant.5" According to the Court, a mandatory death sen-
tence treats all persons convicted of a specific offense "not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferenti-
ated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death."57 This type of disregard for humanity conflicted with the re-
quirement that, because the death penalty is qualitatively different
from all other sentences, courts must ensure reliability in the determi-
nation that death is an appropriate sanction. The Court explained
that mandatory death penalty statutes offer no reliability because they
do not require consideration of the individual or the circumstances
surrounding the case.59 As a result, the Court held that the
mandatory death sentences did not respond to the requirement of
Furman:6  "replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objec-
52. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
53. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
54. Id. at 293. The Court further explained that "[a)t least since the Revolution, Amer-
ican jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict de-
fendants where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict." Id.
This resulted in legislative bodies enacting discretionary jury sentencing. Id.
55. Id. at 301. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) ("[Tlhe Eighth
Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contem-
porary society.... [T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justifi-
cation that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.").
56. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
57. Id. The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of both
the character and record of the defendant and of the particular circumstances of the of-
fense in the process of imposing the death penalty. Id.
58. Id. at 305.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 302; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976).
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tive standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the
process for imposing a sentence of death."61
2. Georgia, Florida, and Texas: Limited and Guided Sentencing Dis-
cretion in Response to Furman.-In contrast to North Carolina's and
Louisiana's death penalty schemes, the Court found Georgia's, Flor-
ida's, and Texas's revised statutes not unconstitutional. 62 Although
the statutes of the three states varied in some respects, all of the stat-
utes gave the jury or judge some discretion when deciding whether to
impose the death penalty.6" The jury's or judge's allotted discretion
came into play in the sentencing phase of the trial.64 Both Florida
and Georgia required the sentencing body to consider and weigh ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances present in the particular case
before deciding on the punishment.65 In Texas, the death penalty law
narrowed the categories of crimes for which the death penalty could
be imposed.66 In the sentencing phase, a Texas jury was presented
with three specific questions about the defendant's conduct and the
likelihood that the defendant posed a continuing threat to society.67
If the jury unanimously answered in the affirmative to all three ques-
tions, the court was obligated to sentence the defendant to death.68 If
there was a negative answer to any question with at least ten people in
agreement, the sentence had to be life imprisonment.6 The Court
held that the sentencing discretion found in the three statutes was not
the same type of discretion that had been held unconstitutional in
61. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
62. See supra notes 44-46 (stating the holdings of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)); see also infra
notes 141-149 and accompanying text (describing current Fifth Amendment concerns with
Florida's death penalty sentencing scheme).
63. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-68 (describing Georgia's statutory scheme for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty, which established a bifurcated trial process whereby the jury or
judge first determines guilt and then determines the punishment at a sentencing hearing);
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-52 (describing the Florida death penalty scheme, which is a trifur-
cated trial process in which the jury or judge first determines guilt, the jury then renders
an advisory sentence as to punishment, and the judge decides on the ultimate punish-
ment); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-71 (describing Texas's death penalty legislation which, like
Georgia's, provides for a bifurcated trial process).
64. See Gregg; 428 U.S. at 163-66; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-51;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270-71.
65. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-64 (describing Georgia's statutory sentencing scheme);
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-51 (listing and describing the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances considered during the capital sentencing procedure).
66. SeeJurek, 428 U.S. at 268.





Furman;70 rather, "'the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear
and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory applica-
tion."' 7  All three states also required prompt appellate review,72
which the Court viewed "[a]s an important additional safeguard
against arbitrariness and caprice.
71
C. The States' Responses to the July 2, 1976 Decisions
The Court's affirmations of Georgia's, Florida's, and Texas's stat-
utes provided states with different models of constitutional death pen-
alty legislation. One of the differences among these statutes was the
respective role of the jury and judge in sentencing." In Georgia, if
the jury acted as the sentencing body, the trial judge was bound by the
jury's recommended sentence.75 The federal government and two-
thirds of the states with capital punishment statutes followed Georgia's
scheme and placed final sentencing power with the jury.76 In five
70. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98 (holding that although the Georgia scheme still allows
some jury discretion, the statute controls the jury discretion by clear and objective stan-
dards); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251-52 (stating that Florida's scheme of weighing eight aggravat-
ing factors against seven mitigating factors requires the trial judge to focus on the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274
(holding that the Texas sentencing procedure effectively guides and focuses the jury
through the sentencing process).
71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
72. See id. at 166-68; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-51; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
74. See Burch, 358 Md. at 288-89, 747 A.2d at 1214-15 (explaining the roles of the jury
and judge in the Georgia and Florida systems and noting that there were structural differ-
ences among the systems of all three states).
75. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2514 (Supp. 1975)).
76. See Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: fTorida's Jury Override and the State
Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 924 n.2 (1991). States that have vested final sen-
tencing authority in the jury are: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1997); Cali-
fornia, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1998); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46a (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to 17-10-32 (1997);
Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); Kentucky, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.8 (West 1991); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1996); New Hampshire, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1996); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995 & Supp.
2000); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1996);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000); Pennsylvania, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(f) (1997); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-
op. 1985); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-27A-3 to 23A-27A-4 (Michie 1998);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (1997); Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.071 (Vernon 1981); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1995); Virginia; VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West
1988); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 1999). In Nevada, if ajury cannot
reach a sentence, a three-judge panel determines the punishment. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 175.554, 175.556 (Michie 1997).
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states-Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska-the judge
alone became authorized to determine the punishment.77 Three
states-Alabama, Delaware, and Indiana-followed Florida's scheme
of sentencing,78 which considered the jury's sentencing decision to be
an advisory verdict that the judge could either accept or override.79
D. Maryland's Response to the July 2, 1976 Decisions
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals confronted the constitutional-
ity of its capital punishment statutes in Blackwell v. State.8 ° At the time,
Maryland had a mandatory death penalty scheme in place.8 ' After
reviewing the statute, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute
did not contain "'any clear or precise guidelines enabling the sentenc-
ing authority to focus [upon] and consider particularized mitigating
factors."',2 The court thus held that Maryland's death penalty statutes
were unconstitutional.83
Following Blackwell, the legislature once again attempted to draft
a death penalty statute, and it looked to Georgia's, Florida's, and
Texas's constitutional capital punishment statutes for guidance. 84 In
the 1978 session, legislators introduced Senate Bill 374, which created
a bifurcated trial process that separately determined guilt and punish-
77. In Arizona, Idaho, and Montana, the capital punishment statutes allow a single
judge to determine the sentence, while in Nebraska and Colorado, the statutes call for
sentence determination by a three-judge panel. See Perruso, supra note 27, at 216 (citing
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 2001); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(a) (Supp.
2000); IDAHo CODE § 19-2515(c) (Michie Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301
(1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995)).
78. Russell, supra note 39, at 6 (citing ALA. CODE § 13-A-5-47(e) (1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-30-2-9(e) (2) (Michie 1998)). Ohio
and Kentucky also refer to the jury's verdict of life or death as a recommendation. Per-
ruso, supra note 27, at 216 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D) (Page 1999); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1) (b) (Baldwin 1995)). In these states, however, the trial judge
may reduce ajury's recommendation of death, but she cannot increase ajury's recommen-
dation of life imprisonment to a death sentence. Id.
79. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(a) ("After the sentence hearing has been conducted, and
after the jury has returned an advisory verdict...." (emphasis added)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209(d) (1) ("A sentence of death shall be imposed, after considering the recommenda-
tion of the jury .... ." (emphasis added)); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2) ("The court is
not bound by the jury's recommendation." (emphasis added)); see also Perruso, supra note 27,
at 215. In the four states, ajudge may use jury override to reduce ajury's advisory sentence
of death or to increase an advisory sentence of life. Perruso, supra note 27, at 215.
80. 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976).
81. Id. at 472, 365 A.2d at 549.
82. Id. at 472-73, 365 A.2d at 549 (alteration in original) (quoting Francis B. Burch,
Attorney General of Maryland).
83. Id. at 473, 365 A.2d at 549.
84. See Burch, 358 Md. at 288, 747 A.2d at 1214.
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ment."5 The bill listed nine aggravating factors and eight mitigating
factors, and it provided guidelines to the jury to lead them, step-by-
step, in their consideration and weighing of the aggravating and miti-
gating factors.86 The bill also mandated automatic and expedited ap-
pellate review 7 and placed sentencing authority with the jury instead
of with the trial judge."8 As a result of these cautionary measures, the
bill passed, and it remains as Maryland's death penalty scheme. 9
E. The Role of the Jury in Capital Punishment Cases
The jury in criminal cases acts to ensure that the government
does not assert unchecked arbitrary power over the criminal process.9 °
The framers of the state and federal governments feared unchecked
power, and this fear expressed itself in the insistence "upon commu-
nity participation in the determination of guilt or innocence" in crimi-
nal cases. 9 This recognition of the importance of a jury trial "applies
with special force" to the decision that precedes the deprivation of
life.92
Historically, legislators placed very few restraints on juries in
criminal cases-likely in response to the vision of the jury as a buffer
between the government and the accused. 93 The authors of state and
federal constitutions recognized from history and experience that gov-
ernments may use illegitimate criminal charges to eliminate ene-
mies.9 4 Indeed, juries act as protection against this potential
85. 62 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 109, 112 (1977).
86. Id. at 112-13. The bill also permitted the sentencing authority to consider any miti-
gating factor not listed. Id.
87. Id. at 113.
88. Id. at 114.
89. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414 (1996).
90. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 482 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens added that "community participation is 'critical to public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system."' Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
91. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
92. Id. at 483; see id. at 482-83 ("The same consideration that supports a constitutional
entitlement to a trial by a jury rather than a judge at the guilt or innocence stage ...
applies with special force to the determination that must precede a deprivation of life.").
93. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1047, 1051 (1991) (explaining that in America, juries in criminal cases have been given
greater discretion than juries in civil cases because of the idea that criminal law is a "knowa-
ble and discoverable fact" and also because of the idea of the jury as a guardian of the
accused's rights). Judge Higginbotham also suggests that legislators have placed fewer
controls on juries in criminal cases than in civil cases because "moral culpability remains
within the domain of everyone's law." Id.
94. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Those who wrote our consti-
tutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against un-
founded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive
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oppression by representing the voice of the community's values and
attitudes." Juries reflect the reluctance of the framers to entrust to
one judge the complete power over the life and liberty of a citizen. 96
Instead, the framers insisted upon community participation in the de-
cision of guilt or innocence and guaranteed the right to a jury trial in
criminal cases.97
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Burch v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge
properly concluded that he possessed no power under Maryland Rule
4-345(b) to modify the defendant's jury-determined death sentence. 98
In reaching its decision, the court reviewed Maryland's death penalty
sentencing scheme, the legislative history of that scheme, the history
of death penalty legislation in the United States, and the sentencing
procedures of other states. 99 The court concluded that the legislative
history of Maryland's death penalty and the language of the death
penalty sentencing scheme mandated that the jury determine the sen-
tence.1° ° Therefore, the court reasoned that if the judge may not
override the jury's sentence at the time of the verdict, he may not
reconsider the sentence at a later time. 01
In so holding, the court relied heavily on the statutory language
of the death penalty laws set forth in the Maryland Annotated Code
(the Code),102 which provide the correct sentencing procedure to be
followed in capital cases.1"' Under the Code, if the jury finds that
to the voice of higher authority."); see also infta Part 1V.B.2 (explaining the danger of al-
lowing elected judges to decide the fates of a criminal defendants charged with capital
crimes).
95. See Higginbotham, supra note 93, at 1052 ("By drawing persons from the populace
and vesting them with powers over the liberty of others and maintaining their anonymity,
we draw upon the jury's ability to mirror the community's values and attitudes.").
96. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-
56).
97. Id. (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
98. Id. at 296, 747 A.2d at 1218.
99. Id. at 281-95, 747 A.2d at 1211-18.
100. Id. at 291-92, 747 A.2d at 1216.
101. Id. at 292, 747 A.2d at 1216.
102. Id. at 281-83, 747 A.2d at 1211-12; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414 (2000)
(setting forth the sentencing scheme in Maryland for capital cases). Section 412 of the
Code provides the punishment for murder. Art. 27, § 412. Section 413 describes the statu-
tory procedure to be followed if the finder of fact determines that a person is guilty of first-
degree murder. Id. § 413. Section 414 states the process of review of death sentences. Id.
§ 414.
103. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (2000) (describing the procedure to be followed if
the finder of fact determines that a person is guilty of first-degree murder). Section 413
lists ten aggravating and eight mitigating factors for the finder of fact to consider in deter-
2001]
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death is the appropriate sentence, then the statute mandates that "the
court shall impose a sentence of death."'1 4 The court explained that
"shall" usually indicates a mandatory intent unless something in the
statute indicates otherwise.'0 5 Therefore, the court reasoned that, ab-
sent the existence of an illegal sentence, the trial judge had no discre-
tion to impose anything other than the jury's verdict.' 6
Burch filed a motion for reconsideration of his death sentence
under Maryland Rule 4-345(b),t° 7 which relates to the court's revisory
power over a sentence upon motion within ninety days after its impo-
sition.' After the trial court found that it lacked the authority to
grant his motion, Burch argued to the Court of Appeals that the rule
applied to capital cases and asserted that if the legislature had in-
tended to preclude modification of death sentences, then it would
have made that intent clear in the language of Rule 4-345.' °9
The court rejected Burch's argument based on the legislative
scheme of the death penalty statute.'10 The Maryland General Assem-
bly had twice rejected bills that included an advisory verdict system
like the one employed in Florida."' The court reasoned that by twice
mining the sentence. Some examples of aggravating factors include: "[t]he defendant
committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any correctional institution,"
"[t]he victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduc-
tion or an attempt to kidnap or abduct," and "[t]he defendant committed the murder
pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration to
commit the murder." Id. §§ 413(d) (2), 413(d) (6). Examples of mitigating factors include:
"[t]he defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or provocation of another
person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution;" and
"[i] t is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would consti-
tute a continuing threat to society." Id. §§ 4 13 (g) (3), 4 13(g) (7).
104. Id. § 413(k) (emphasis added).
105. Burch, 358 Md. at 284, 747 A.2d at 1212 (citing Hirsch v. Md. Dep't of Natural Res.,
288 Md. 95, 116, 416 A.2d 10, 21 (1980); Pope v. Sec'y of Pers., 46 Md. App. 716, 717, 420
A.2d 1017, 1018 (1980)).
106. Id. at 285, 747 A.2d at 1213.
107. MD. R. 4-345(b); see supra note 2 (stating what Rule 4-345(b) permits regarding the
power of a trial judge to reconsider sentences).
108. Burch, 358 Md. at 280, 747 A.2d at 1210.
109. Id. at 283, 747 A.2d at 1212. Burch also argued that section 413(k) "only requires
the judge to impose a death sentence in accord with thejury verdict and is not a limitation
on the judge's power to modify sentences." Id.
110. Id. at 284, 747 A.2d at 1212; see also supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the legislative history of the current death penalty laws in Maryland and in other
states).
111. See Burch, 358 Md. at 290-91, 747 A.2d at 1215-16. Three death penalty laws were
introduced in 1977 and 1978: Senate Bill 374 (the one eventually accepted), Senate Bill
106, and Senate Bill 373. Id. Senate Bills 106 and 373 employed the advisory jury verdict
model similar to Florida's system. Id. at 291, 747 A.2d at 1216. Governor Marvin Mandel
vetoed Senate Bill 106, and the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee "reported unfavor-
ably" on Senate Bill 373. Id.
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rejecting a system that allowed advisory opinions, the legislature
demonstrated its faith injury authority over sentencing.1 2 The court
concluded, therefore, that if the legislature did not want a judge to be
able to override the jury's verdict, it would not have wanted that same
judge to be able to reconsider the sentence at a later time." 3
Finally, the court considered judicial efficiency concerns and the
traditional role of the jury and concluded that the trial judge had no
authority to override or reconsider a jury sentence.1 14
IV. ANALYSIS
In Burch, the Court of Appeals confronted the concept of jury
override," 5 which permits the trial judge to impose a different sen-
tence than the one reached by the jury.'16 The Burch court rejected
this concept and emphasized the legislative intent to vest capital sen-
tencing authority in the jury." 7 By rejecting the jury override system,
the Burch court properly acknowledged the role of the jury as the
voice of the community and the special nature of capital punishment.
Moreover, the decision in Burch recognized that ajury override system
112. 1I at 291-92, 747 A.2d at 1216.
113. Id. at 292, 747 A.2d at 1216. The court also highlighted cases from New Mexico
and Wyoming that also dealt with the jury override issue. Id. at 292-95, 747 A.2d at 1216-18.
The two states and Maryland have similar death penalty laws and rules of procedure gov-
erning review of sentences. Id. at 292, 747 A.2d at 1216. Courts in both Wyoming and New
Mexico reached similar conclusions about the power of the trial judge in reconsidering
sentences. Id., 747 A.2d at 1216-17. The high courts of both states concluded that the
appellate courts, not the trial courts, have the power to review death sentences. See Hop-
kinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 153 (Wyo. 1981) ("[T]he [trial] judge has no ability to over-
rule the jury's determination, short of finding, as a matter of law, the evidence insufficient
to support the jury's conclusion."); State v. Guzman, 676 P.2d 1321, 1328 (N.M. 1984) ("In
ajury proceeding, the jury determines whether to impose the death penalty; the trial judge
must abide by this determination.... The trial judge, therefore, correctly ruled that it had
no authority to modify the death sentence in ajury proceeding."); see also Burch, 358 Md. at
294-95, 747 A.2d at 1217-18 (discussing and quoting the holdings of these cases).
114. Burch, 358 Md. at 290, 747 A.2d at 1215-16 (quoting Memorandum from ThomasJ.
Peddicord, Jr., supra note 23, at 37); see also infra notes 150-158 and accompanying text
(describing the economic and judicial costs of the jury override system).
115. In the jury override system, the jury's sentencing decision acts as an advisory ver-
dict. See Russell, supra note 39, at 10. The override statutes permit the judge to either
accept or override the jury's verdict. Id. Four states-Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and
Indiana-adopted the jury override system. Id. Of the four states, Florida was the first
state to implement the system, and the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in Prof
fitt v. florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-53 (1976). The Proffitt Court explained thatjury sentencing
is not a constitutional requirement and, in fact, suggested that judicial power of sentencing
should lead to greater consistency in the imposition of capital punishment at the trial level
because of the trial judge's greater experience in sentencing. Id. at 252.
116. Burch, 358 Md. at 289-92, 747 A.2d at 1215-16.
117. Id. at 291-92, 747 A.2d at 1216.
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is contrary to the traditional role of the jury in capital cases, to the
theory behind the death penalty itself, and to specific constitutional
provisions. In practice, the jury override system is judicially inefficient
and raises the potential for abuse by elected judges. Thus, the Burch
decision guards against these problems by following a safe and effi-
cient process in deciding capital sentencing cases.
A. The Importance of Jury Determination in Capital Cases
1. An Historical Perspective.-The traditional role of the jury as
the community voice in the decision of guilt or innocence is especially
critical in capital cases.11s Under the common law and throughout
the last century, government has mandated death sentences for cer-
tain categories of crimes." 9 In specific cases, however, jurors would
disregard their oaths and refuse to convict a defendant of one of those
crimes if they felt that the death penalty was morally unjustified for
that defendant.120 Thus, jurors played a role as "nullifier of govern-
ment policy"' 2 ' by refusing to convict certain defendants when they
believed that the defendant did not deserve the death penalty.'22 Ju-
rors' disagreement with state-determined punishment forced judges
and legislators to modify capital punishment statutes to more accu-
rately reflect society's moral sensibilities.' 23 An examination of history
reveals that juries and the process ofjury sentencing "played a critical
role in ensuring that capital punishment is imposed in a manner con-
sistent with evolving standards of decency."' 24 In Burch, the Court of
Appeals reviewed the history of Maryland's death penalty sentencing
scheme and explained that the Maryland General Assembly had ex-
amined several different capital punishment systems, such as the Flor-
118. See Mello & Robson, supra note 32, at 51. A death penalty decision requires a con-
nection between the judicial proceeding and community values in order to be morally and
constitutionally legitimate. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). The Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment draws its mean-
ing "from the evolving standards of decency" of society. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958). Therefore, the jury, as the representative of the community, acts as the constitu-
tionally required link between the penal system and contemporary community values.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
119. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 483-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained:
"Under the common law capital punishment was mandatory for all felonies, and even
through the last century it was mandatory for large categories of offenses." Id. at 483.
120. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
121. Higginbotham, supra note 93, at 1051.
122. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 484 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (explaining that jury reluctance to convict defendants under mandatory sen-




ida and Georgia systems.' 25 In 1978, the General Assembly made the
deliberate choice to retain the jury as the sentencing body in capital
cases and not to allow a trial judge to alter thatjury decision. 126 Thus,
the Burch court followed the established principle of allowing the jury
to have the final decision in capital sentencing.
2. The Theory of Punishment in Death Penalty Cases.-The underly-
ing policies of capital punishment support the idea that the jury is the
body best suited to decide in which cases the death penalty is an ap-
propriate punishment. Four widely accepted reasons exist for the im-
position of state-sanctioned punishment: rehabilitation of the
offender, incapacitation of the offender, deterrence of potential of-
fenders, and retribution, or the community's desire for revenge. 127
The first of these reasons is obviously not the justification for the
death penalty because death cannot possibly accomplish the goal of
rehabilitation. 12' The second justification-incapacitation-may be
accomplished through less extreme means such as a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. 129 The death penalty may serve the
social purpose of deterrence, but statistical attempts to measure the
deterrent effect of capital punishment have been inconclusive. 130 Be-
cause people kill for different reasons (for example, some kill in the
heat of passion, while others kill for money), the intended deterrent
effect of the death penalty will not reach everyone who kills.13 ' The
Supreme Court has articulated that the legislatures, not the courts,
are the proper bodies to determine the deterrent value of capital
punishment.
13 2
125. See Burch, 358 Md. at 289-92, 747 A.2d at 1215-16 (describing the various capital
punishment systems proposed in the 1977 and 1978 sessions).
126. Id. at 289, 747 A.2d at 1215.
127. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 477-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing these justifications
for punishment and explaining that in order to determine whether punishment is cruel
and unusual, one must first identify the reasons for imposing the punishment).
128. Id. at 478.
129. Id.
130. SeeGreggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976). In announcing the judgment of
the Court, Justice Stewart noted that "' [a]fter all possible inquiry, including the probing of
all possible methods of inquiry, we do not know, and for systematic and easily visible rea-
sons cannot know, what the truth about this deterrent effect may be.'" Id. at 185 (quoting
C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 25-26 (1974)).
131. See id. at 185-86. Mandatory capital punishment may have a deterrent effect on
people who kill for money, but the Court has invalidated mandatory capital punishment
sentencing schemes. See Spaziano, 486 U.S. at 480 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, capi-
tal punishment cannot rest entirely upon deterrent considerations. Id.




Retribution stands out as the most likely explanation for the
death penalty; "capital punishment is an expression of society's moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct." '33 The decision to impose
capital punishment rests upon "an assessment of ... the 'moral guilt'
[an ethical judgment] of the defendant."" 4 Because capital punish-
ment is a vehicle for the community to express outrage, a jury should
be the body entrusted with the task of deciding whether or not to
impose it. 3 ' A jury is composed of a cross section of the community
and therefore is in the best position to judge the offender on the scale
of community outrage.' 36 While the Court has developed procedural
safeguards for defendants, sentencing is not an algebraic equation; 137
the sentencer must resolve both pure and special questions of fact. 138
In resolving these special questions of fact, a jury uses its moral, fac-
133. Id. at 183. Justice Stewart added: "'[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the na-
ture of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law.'" Id. (quoting
Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
134. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982)).
135. See Mello & Robson, supra note 32, at 49-50.
136. Id.; see also Mello, supra note 76, at 931 ("Because the death penalty is society's
expression of outrage, juries rather than judges are more likely to rank reliably the of-
fender and his or her offense on the yardstick of community anger."). But cf Comment, Is
the Power to Be Lenient Also the Power to Discriminate? An Analysis ofJustice Blackmun's Evolving
Perspective on jury Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 5 TEMPLE POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 75, 76
(1995) ("[W]hat makes the American jury so valuable, the gathering of twelve ordinary
people, is also what makes it so dangerous."). Supporters of the jury override system be-
lieve that it will lead to greater consistency in sentencing because the trial judge has more
knowledge and experience with which to consider the facts of the case before him. Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) ("[I]t would appear that judicial sentencing should
lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of
capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a
jury . . . ."); Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1058 (Ind. 1983) ("Rather, the trial court,
with more experience in the criminal system, has better knowledge with which to compare
the facts of this case with that of other criminal activity.").
Other supporters of the jury override system claim that the judge will ensure that the
death penalty is not imposed in a "wanton or freakish manner" because of jury prejudice.
Exparte Hays, 518 So. 2d 768, 776 (Ala. 1986). Because jurors who have never decided a
capital case may be shocked by the severity of the crime they are considering, judges may
be better able to balance the facts of the case because of their experience in the criminal
system. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973). "Thus the inflamed emotions of
jurors can no longer sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial
experience." Id.
137. See Note, The Death Penalty Cases: Shaping Substantive Criminal Law, 58 IND. L.J. 187,
208 (1982) [hereinafter The Death Penalty Cases] (explaining the importance of jury input
in sentencing decisions because the question of whether someone lives or dies involves
moral and legal judgments, not simply mathematics).
138. Id. Examples of the special questions of fact that the jury must resolve include
weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and determining whether
the defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society. Id.
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tual, and legal judgments, and brings in the values of the community
to reach a sentencing decision." 9 The jury therefore performs the
constitutionally mandated function of serving as the link between con-
temporary community values and the penal system.14 ° The Burch deci-
sion thus affirms the strength of this link and ensures thatjudges have
no authority to interfere with a power that has been entrusted to a
jury.
3. Constitutional Concerns.-Although a majority of the Supreme
Court upheld the jury override system as constitutional,1 41 judges on
state courts and legal commentators continue to argue that the system
violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.142 The Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that once a jury
finds a criminal defendant not guilty of a crime, the issue of that de-
fendant's guilt or innocence is beyond the power of the judge to over-
ride.14 The changes in states' capital punishment statutes caused a
substantive change in the elements of the degrees of homicide.' 4 4 In
139. Id. In contrast to the jury's duty, a judge's duty does not reflect the community's
sentiment; instead, the judge's role is to apply the law impartially. Mello & Robson, supra
note 32, at 49. Because the death penalty involves a determination combining both com-
munity sentiment and law, judges should not make sentencing decisions "unless or until we
are willing to evaluate prospective judges as to their propensity to embody communal con-
sciousness." Id. at 47.
140. See Mello & Robson, supra note 32, at 52 ("The central function of the jury as a
bulwark between an individual and the government is especially vital when the individual's
life is at stake."); see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens wrote: "It may well be argued that... the jury may be regarded as a
microcosm of the community, who will reflect the changing attitudes of society as a whole
to the infliction of capital punishment, and that there could therefore be no more appro-
priate body to decide whether [to impose the death penalty] .... " Harris, 513 U.S. at 517
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953,
Report 200 (1953)).
141. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-52.
142. See, e.g., Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1064-65 (Ind. 1983) (DeBruler, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (arguing that a jury recommendation against the death penalty
should be treated as a verdict of not guilty on the issue of punishment and that the jury
override system violates the Double Jeopardy Clause); The Death Penalty Cases, supra note
137, at 189-90 (arguing that the sentencing phase of a capital trial is like a trial to deter-
mine whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder and that procedural due process
guarantees require a jury to make such determinations).
143. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. No state statute or act of Congress can change this. Only a
constitutional amendment could do so. See Schiro, 451 N.E.2d at 1064 (DeBruler, J., dis-
senting). The underlying basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an offense after a
jury's acquittal. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Such repeated at-
tempts by the State would subject the individual to "embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and [would compel] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
[enhance] the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." Id.
144. See The Death Penalty Cases, supra note 137, at 190.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the bifurcated and trifurcated death penalty statutes, the sentencing
phase of a capital trial became a second trial to determine whether a
defendant, who had already been convicted of murder, was also guilty
of capital murder. 145 The aggravating circumstances and other fac-
tors that the sentencer must weigh are factual elements of the addi-
tional crime of capital murder.146 Therefore, because the sentencer is
deciding additional factual elements, a jury should make these find-
ings.' 47 Consequently, ajury recommendation against the death pen-
alty should be treated as an acquittal of capital murder, 148 which the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the trial judge from altering.149 By
failing to endorse the jury override system in Maryland, the Court of
Appeals in Burch has helped to establish a sentencing scheme that is
consistent with these constitutional concerns. This decision thus en-
sures that a criminal defendant's right against double jeopardy will
not be violated during the sentencing phase of capital cases.
B. Practical Application of the Jury Override System
1. The Economic and Judicial Costs of the Jury Override.-States cre-
ated the jury override to check juries' wanton or freakish application
of the death penalty, but judges often use it as a tool to increase the
jury's recommendation of life to a sentence of death and, in doing so,
increase the judicial and economic costs of capital cases.' 5 ° For exam-
ple, as of 1984, Florida courts had sentenced 347 persons to death.' 5 '
In 85 of those cases, the trial judge overrode the jury's advisory life
sentence. 152 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed 61 of those 85, but
it affirmed only 19.153 A federal court later reversed 7 of the 19
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Schiro, 451 N.E.2d at 1066 (DeBrulerJ., dissenting) ("The substance beneath [a
recommendation of death] is a factual adjudication and moral judgment of the jury, not a
court master, not a court commissioner, but ajury of twelve .... ."); The Death Penalty Cases,
supra note 137, at 190 (arguing that the Constitution and due process guarantees mandate
that the jury make such findings).
148. Schiro, 451 N.E. 2d at 1065 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 1064-65 ("[T]he sentencing judge in making a final determination of the
sentence can have no power to override it and impose death.").
150. See Mello & Robson, supra note 32, at 52-55.
151. Id. at 53. Florida's system provides a good example for examination because it was
the first state to implement the jury override system, and, of the four states, it has used the
override system most frequendy. See id. at 32-34.
152. Id. at 53.
153. Id.
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cases. 154 Thus, out of the original 85 override cases, the appellate sys-
tem affirmed only 12 cases or roughly 20%.
15 5
In another example, in the years between 1986 and 1991, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed overrides in more than 93% of the
relevant cases.' 5 6 Some commentators estimate that a repeal of the
override power would reduce the Florida Supreme Court's caseload
by 25%. 1 5' As the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized in Burch,
the jury override system involves a judge duplicating the jury's ef-
fort,'5 8 with appellate courts thereafter consistently rejecting the
judge's conclusion and affirming the jury's sentence.
2. The Potential for Abuse by Elected Judges.-The jury override sys-
tem also creates a mechanism by which political motivations, judicial
biases, and public sentiment may enter into the realm of capital sen-
tencing-a result that is contrary to the tenets of the American legal
system. 159 In most states that impose capital punishment, judges are
subject to election or retention.16 ° The political election process
sometimes compels a judge to choose between that of which she
thinks society will approve and that which the law requires.1 6 ' In this
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Mello, supra note 76, at 937-38; id. at 938 (concluding that a reversal rate of over
eighty percent is a strong indicator that trial judges should listen to juries because "a jury's
verdict for life means life, save in the rarest of cases").
157. See Mello & Robson, supra note 32, at 54. The jury override system not only sacri-
fices judicial efficiency, but it also increases the overall cost of the judicial system. See id. at
54-55. Commentators estimated the economic cost of the jury override system in Florida to
be approximately $8.7 million per year. Id. at 55. That number was derived by multiplying
the average cost of an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court ($100,000) by the number of
override cases in 1984 (87 cases). Id. Because the appellate courts reversed eighty percent
of the override cases, the money spent on the appeal is "wasted," and the state must then
pay for the appellant's life in prison in addition to the money spent on the appeal process.
Id.
158. Burch, 358 Md. at 290, 747 A.2d at 1215 (quoting Memorandum from Thomas J.
Peddicord, Jr., supra note 23, at 37).
159. See Erlich, supra note 29, at 1440-46 (arguing that political election ofjudges allows
these elements to creep into death penalty sentencing decisions).
160. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 776 (1995).
Thirty-eight states-Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming-currently
have capital punishment statutes. Id. at 779 n.88. All of these states, with the exception of
Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia, use
elections at some point in judicial selection or retention. Id. at 779 n.89.
161. Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640, 650-51 (Ala. 1978) (Jones, J., dissenting).
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way, elections threaten the independence of the judiciary and a capi-
tal defendant's constitutional rights because judges may succumb to
political pressure and deprive a defendant of his due process rights.1 62
Political pressure is even more apparent when judges preside
over highly publicized cases.' 63 The jury override system provides
judges with a mechanism by which to escape political attacks from op-
ponents and the media alleging, for example, that the judge is soft on
the death penalty.164 Bryan Stevenson, head of the EqualJustice Initi-
ative in Alabama, conducted a multiple regression analysis on Ala-
bama overrides and concluded that "there is a statistically significant
correlation between judicial override and election years in most of the
counties where these overrides [took] place."'165 After taking into ac-
count the necessary factors for analysis, Stevenson found that some-
thing other than legal doctrine had affected Alabama judges' use of
the jury override.' 66 The death penalty has become such a prominent
campaign issue that judges will likely suffer political consequences for
failing to override popular jury verdicts-especially in highly publi-
cized cases that might eventually become election issues. 167
162. See Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override,
1999 Wis. L. REv. 1017, 1019-20. "When ajudge plays both a partisan and ajudicial role,
her tenure may depend on the outcome of a case. Significantly, the United States Su-
preme Court has already recognized a due process violation under similar circum-
stances .... " Id. at 1020.
163. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 160, at 765. Toughness on crime has emerged as
the dominant political issue. Id. at 770-71. The death penalty has become the vehicle by
which politicians demonstrate how tough they are on crime. Id. at 770. Given these politi-
cal pressures, judges are more likely than jurors to impose the death penalty, and in states
that have ajury override system,judges override jury-imposed life sentences far more often
than they override jury-imposed death sentences. Id. at 766.
164. See Erlich, supra note 29, at 1441.
165. Burnside, supra note 162, at 1039 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the
Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 256 (1994), quoting in turn Bryan
Stevenson). The study asked: "If one looks at the entire period covered by the Alabama
override statute, could the existing pattern reasonably have occurred by chance?" Id. at
1040. A measurement of statistical significance is used to determine whether chance
caused the difference. Id. Once the threshold for statistical significance has been crossed,
some factor besides chance caused the difference; in the case ofjury override and election,
the other factor is unconstitutional, arbitrary capital sentencing. Id. at 1041.
166. Id. The other factor considered in the analysis was the impact of the 1986 Califor-
nia Supreme Court election, which resulted in the removal of the chiefjustice because of
her refusal to impose the death penalty in certain cases. Id. After her removal from the
bench, judges became even more concerned about the impact of death penalty decisions
on their prospects for reelection. See id. Stevenson therefore split the data into subsets
divided by the 1986 election and found the results to be statistically significant. See id.
167. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 160, at 785 ("Not only the judge, but her political
supporters as well, may suffer the consequences of an unpopular ruling in a capital case.").
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Thus, a judge seeking reelection holds a personal interest in the
outcome of a capital punishment case and can deprive a defendant of
constitutional rights because her tenure may depend on the public's
response to her decision in the case.168 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Tumey v. Ohio'69 held that a judge's "direct, personal, substantial, pe-
cuniary interest"' in the outcome of a criminal case violates the
criminal defendant's due process rights.' 71 In the case of elected
judges, "[a] judicial position is a career for most, which effectively
ends if not reelected."1 72 Because reelection concerns present a chal-
lenge to a judge's career interests and jury override statutes allow
judges to impose the death penalty in politically charged situations,
jury override statutes violate due process as described in Tumey.'73 Ju-
dicial elections in states with jury override statutes threaten the inde-
pendent decisionmaking of a judge and erode a capital defendant's
due process rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Burch v. State presented the Court of Appeals of Maryland with
the option of including some sort ofjury override in its death penalty
scheme, but the court correctly rejected this proposal. The legislature
in Maryland, as well as in a great majority of other states, used history
and policy considerations in designating the jury as the ultimate sen-
tencing authority. The jury override system that exists in some states
is contrary to the traditional role of the jury in Maryland and, in prac-
tice, is judicially inefficient and contrary to many policy goals. The
jury maintains the critical link between the community and the penal
system, and the nature of the death penalty requires this link to en-
168. Burnside, supra note 162, at 1020.
169. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
170. Id. at 523.
171. Id. at 535. Two separate tests for violation of due process arose from Tumey. Burn-
side, supra note 162, at 1045. The first test is whether the judge has a "'direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest'" in the outcome of the litigation. Id. (quoting Tumey, 273
U.S. at 523). If so, due process is violated. Id, The second test for determining whether
there is a due process violation is "if there is 'a possible temptation . . . not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused."' Id. (quoting Tumey, 273
U.S. at 532). For the second test, one looks to see whether a judge is faced with "'circum-
stances that present some actual incentive to find one way or the other or a real possibility
of bias.'" Id. at 1046 (quoting DelVecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363,
1372 (7th Cir. 1994)). If these circumstances cause ajudge "to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant," then the judge violates the defendant's due process
rights. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
172. Burnside, supra note 162, at 1046.
173. Id. at 1047.
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sure that the application of the death penalty is consistent with cur-
rent community values.
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